Column key (matrix order): A relief_workforce · B relief_supply · C coverage_02 · D coverage_34 · E coverage_512 · F procedural · G federalism · H durability · I passthrough_risk · J participation_risk · K preference_fit · L integrity_risk · M distributional · N evaluability Row numbering: 1 = a1_ccdf_supercharge … 12 = cash_comparator (matrix order as given in the brief).
1. The matrix
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a1_ccdf_supercharge | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| a2_medicaid_entitlement | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| a3_headstart_scaled | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| a4_k12_extension | 4 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| a5_demand_allowance | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| a6_supply_first | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| a7_social_insurance | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| a8_public_option | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| a9_fallback_ladder | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| a10_trishare_federal | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| a11_caregiver_choice | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| cash_comparator | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
2. Cell-by-cell basis
| Cell | Score | Basis | Flag |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1A | 3 | ws06 (2024 CCDF rule addressed rate-setting/payment practices) = indirect wage support only; no compensation program of the DC-PEF type (ws04). Anchor-3 language exactly. | evidenced-wash |
| 1B | 3 | Nothing in the base on CCDF building capacity; rate-setting sustains existing providers. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 1C | 3 | ws08: 73% of sub-poverty households pay $0 via HS/subsidies/kin; binding burden sits with the near-poor above eligibility lines. Anchor 3 = subsidised/poor only. | evidenced |
| 1D | 3 | Same finding (ws08). | evidenced |
| 1E | 3 | Base never states CCDF's age range; ws03 notes school-age is absent from every collected estimate. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 1F | 4 | ws11: "anything that moves money survives"; block-grant expansion is pure money. Rate-setting as a grant condition sits in ws11's contested middle → not 5. | evidenced |
| 1G | 2 | ws06: CBO's BBB score embeds substantial state non-participation; holdout is the official base case; block grant has no fallback. Row spec inherits non-participation. | evidenced |
| 1H | 3 | Capped mandatory funding + existing constituency, but no dedicated revenue (ws04 DC PEF lesson; ws03 Georgia earmark as the contrast case). | evidenced-wash |
| 1I | 3 | ws09: pass-through is instrument-dependent; CCDF is mixed (administered rates + certificates). Anchor 3 = mixed instruments. | evidenced-wash |
| 1J | 3 | Cost-estimation rate-setting = anchor-3 "cost-based rates"; ws06 (2024 rule) and ws12 (rate-participation risk live) both bear. | evidenced |
| 1K | 4 | CCDF certificates reach relative/home-based care (row spec's own "CCDF relative care at margins"); ws08 documents 0–3 home-care preference. Not 5 — no evidence it funds the 0–3 modal arrangement adequately. | judgment-call |
| 1L | 3 | ws06: state-administered provider-side grants governable; standard grant oversight = anchor 3. | evidenced-wash |
| 1M | 3 | ws08 cuts both ways: near-poor peak sits above current lines (bad) but a "supercharge" widens eligibility (good). No net evidence. | evidenced-wash |
| 1N | 3 | Cross-state variation is observational only (= anchor 3); ws09's 11-states+DC stopgap comparison shows that channel works, nothing more. | evidenced-wash |
| 2A | 3 | No compensation mechanism specified; administered rates are indirect at best. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 2B | 2 | ws15 Germany: enforceable entitlement produces litigation/damages, not slots; ws06 imports this explicitly for architecture 2. Quebec: price-below-cost without workforce investment → rationing. | evidenced |
| 2C | 4 | Nominal universal individual entitlement reaches all 0–2s; docked from 5 by the Germany queue evidence and unspecified home-based inclusion. | judgment-call |
| 2D | 4 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 2E | 3 | Spec silent on school-age. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 2F | 3 | ws11: money survives, mandates/standards die; row spec's own Byrd exposure on standards → anchor 3 "reconcilable with major strips". | evidenced |
| 2G | 2 | ws06: CBO assumed massive non-participation in exactly this federal-state match design; no fallback. | evidenced |
| 2H | 4 | ws15 Germany: courts hold the entitlement enforceable despite shortages — entitlements entrench legally. Transfer to US is my inference. | judgment-call |
| 2I | 4 | Public administered rates rather than family-side subsidy; ws15 Quebec shows price-capped designs ration rather than inflate. | evidenced |
| 2J | 2 | ws12: rate-participation risk is live — operators already exiting at market prices will exit faster at below-cost public rates; ws15 Canada rate/for-profit-cap fight. | evidenced |
| 2K | 3 | Delivery mix unspecified; ws08's 0–3 home-based preference unaddressed by the record for this design. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 2L | 3 | Standard state-administered oversight; nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 2M | 3 | Nothing in base on incidence of this design. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 2N | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 3A | 3 | Federal grants cover operating cost incl. wages (indirect); no parity/pipeline mechanism evidenced for Head Start in the base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 3B | 4 | ws09/ws06: provider-side operating grants at $24B sustained 220k providers and suppressed costs — federal-to-grantee funding is that instrument class. Docked from 5: ws04's pipeline finding (40k CDA/yr vs 220k net-new hires) and "unprecedented build-out". | judgment-call |
| 3C | 4 | Universal by spec; docked from 5 for unspecified home-based reach and the ws04 ramp constraint. | judgment-call |
| 3D | 4 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 3E | 3 | Base does not establish Head Start's age scope. (I believe as-implemented it excludes school-age; the record doesn't say so, so I held neutral.) | unevidenced-neutral |
| 3F | 4 | ws11 names architectures 3 and 8: standards inside federal spending programs are "the most Byrd-defensible home for quality provisions that exists". | evidenced |
| 3G | 5 | ws06: holdout is the base case and direct-federal/fallback is the answer; federal-to-local bypasses states entirely. | evidenced |
| 3H | 4 | ws10/ws13: NHSA is an organised, design-contingent constituency that endorsed BBB's structure — a real constituency, no dedicated revenue. | evidenced |
| 3I | 5 | ws09: supply-side operating grants demonstrably suppressed prices at $24B scale. Anchor 5 exactly. | evidenced |
| 3J | 5 | Anchor 5 "doesn't depend on incumbent participation" — grantee network is built, not bought; ws12's rate-participation finding does not bind. | judgment-call |
| 3K | 2 | ws08: under-3s' modal arrangement is individual unpaid care (26.5%) and "a center-only buildout misreads the 0–3 market". Head Start's centre-based form is my reading, not the base's statement. | judgment-call |
| 3L | 4 | ws06: $24B of provider-side grants with administration produced no headline fraud — moderate-confidence "governable"; grantee audit surface. | evidenced |
| 3M | 3 | Nothing in base on distribution of a scaled-universal Head Start. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 3N | 3 | Nothing in base (Head Start Impact Study is not in the record). | unevidenced-neutral |
| 4A | 4 | ws07's Boston decomposition names "pay near parity" as a quality dimension of district pre-K; ws13: school-based pre-K educators fold into teacher unions. Not 5 — no pipeline funding evidenced. | evidenced |
| 4B | 4 | ws10/ws15: GA/OK/FL universal pre-K operating 20–30 years, FL "high coverage" — district/state pre-K demonstrably builds slots at the 4-y-o tier. Docked for rural/deserts silence (ws05). | evidenced |
| 4C | 1 | Definitional: architecture does not reach 0–2 (row spec; brief's explicit instruction). | evidenced (definitional) |
| 4D | 5 | ws15/ws10: universal pre-K enacted and sustained at scale in three red states; spec extends to age 3. Anchor 5 = universal 3–4. | evidenced |
| 4E | 5 | Spec covers before/after/summer via districts; ws08 quantifies the demand it addresses (5.2M of 6.7M middle-schoolers unserved; summer most acute). | evidenced (definitional scope) |
| 4F | 4 | ws11 general rule: money via existing formulas survives; no behaviour mandates required. No education-specific Byrd finding in the base. | judgment-call |
| 4G | 4 | ws10/ws15: universality at the 4-y-o tier is "politically stable everywhere it's been tried" including red states — holdout risk materially lower than for match designs, but still state/district-dependent. | evidenced |
| 4H | 5 | ws10 (20–30 yrs durable across partisan turnover), ws03 (Georgia lottery earmark ≈30 yrs = dedicated revenue), ws13 (teacher-union entanglement). Constituency + dedicated revenue + entanglement. | evidenced |
| 4I | 5 | Direct public provision — anchor 5; ws09's supply-side/demand-side asymmetry. | evidenced |
| 4J | 4 | Public districts, not incumbent private operators accepting below-cost public rates (ws12 contrast). Docked: mixed-delivery contracting is not specified. | judgment-call |
| 4K | 3 | ws08: 3–5s' modal arrangement is centre-based (42.1%) — good fit in band; but no home-based support and no 0–2 at all. | evidenced-wash |
| 4L | 4 | Public entities with existing accountability; not the demand-side clawback shape ws06 flags. | judgment-call |
| 4M | 3 | Nothing in base on incidence; FL's "high coverage, low standards" is a quality finding, not distributional. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 4N | 4 | ws07: the record's two best causal studies (Boston lottery, TN VPK RCT) both come from oversubscribed district/state pre-K — this architecture reliably generates quasi-random variation, though not by design. | judgment-call |
| 5A | 1 | Row spec: no supply-side machinery. ws15 Australia: demand-side wage funding passed into fees; Canberra had to bolt on supply-side strings. Anchor 1 exactly. | evidenced |
| 5B | 2 | ws15 Australia + ws12 (private capital rationalising, not expanding). ws09 nuance: ~29% chain slack gives short-run absorption, so not 1. | evidenced |
| 5C | 4 | Universal, portable, childcare-earmarked money reaches all 0–2 families; docked from 5 by ws05 deserts (46% of under-6s; rural >70%) — money cannot buy absent care. | judgment-call |
| 5D | 4 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 5E | 3 | Age scope unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 5F | 5 | ws11: tax-side/money provisions are what survive reconciliation (the ARP strike was the wage mandate, not the money). Cleanest fit on the board. | evidenced |
| 5G | 5 | No state machinery; ws06's holdout base case does not bite. | evidenced |
| 5H | 3 | Broad family constituency, but no dedicated revenue and ws11's H11.2 sunset mechanism (BBB written time-limited) + ARPA cliff. | evidenced-wash |
| 5I | 1 | ws09 names architecture 5 explicitly: "architecture 5 (demand-side allowance) carries the inflation risk"; ws15 Australia fees outran subsidy. Anchor 1. | evidenced |
| 5J | 4 | Pays market price — does not require incumbents to accept below-cost public rates (ws12's failure mode does not apply). Not 5: still needs providers to exist. | judgment-call |
| 5K | 4 | Portable to the arrangement the family chooses; ws08 preference data. Docked from 5: base does not say informal/kin care is payable under a5. | judgment-call |
| 5L | 2 | ws06: "the Netherlands case remains the binding caution for demand-side clawback design"; advanceable credit = advance-and-reconcile shape. A 1 is defensible under the anchor's own wording; I held at 2 because the base names the case without documenting its magnitude and a5's income-testing is unspecified. | judgment-call |
| 5M | 2 | ws09: in chain-served markets subsidies fill seats; in deserts they "can only raise prices" → value accrues in already-served markets (anchor-1 language, partially). | evidenced |
| 5N | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 6A | 5 | Spec funds compensation + credentialing pipeline; ws04 DC PEF: wage enhancements reduced turnover, 64% same-centre retention, 23% one-year ROI. Anchor 5 is literally "DC-PEF-style". | evidenced |
| 6B | 4 | ws04: retention is the dominant lever (halving turnover saves more hires than all growth hiring); ws05 CDFI facilities channel. Docked from 5: ws05 warns a single national capital instrument misfires on rural, and the spec does not rural-weight. | evidenced |
| 6C | 4 | Universal eligibility eventually opens (spec); ws04/ws15 support that a workforce-first sequence is the one that doesn't convert money into queues. Docked for the 3–5-year delay. | judgment-call |
| 6D | 4 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 6E | 3 | Silent on school-age. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 6F | 4 | ws11: compensation funding (grants paying wages, DC-PEF-style) is budgetary and survivable; only mandates die. | evidenced |
| 6G | 3 | Delivery channel unspecified (ARPA analogue was state-administered but universally taken up — not enough to score). | unevidenced-neutral |
| 6H | 2 | ws04/ws10: the flagship compensation programme (DC PEF) is annually contested and funded below requirement after an elimination scare; ws09/ws10 ARPA cliff shows supply-side money without dedicated revenue collapsing on schedule. No family constituency during the build years. | evidenced |
| 6I | 5 | ws09: supply-side operating grants suppressed prices at $24B. | evidenced |
| 6J | 4 | Grants raise provider revenue rather than imposing below-cost rates (ws12 contrast). Not 5: still routed through incumbents. | judgment-call |
| 6K | 3 | Setting mix unspecified; ws05 notes FCC decline (−11%) sits outside the licensed-capacity measure. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 6L | 4 | ws06: $24B of supply-side grants without headline fraud — provider-side grants governable. | evidenced |
| 6M | 3 | ws05: post-ARPA recovery was non-rural and supply-first "must be rural-weighted or re-run the pattern" — spec doesn't specify, so the evidence nets out. | evidenced-wash |
| 6N | 3 | National temporal staging creates no comparison group; nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7A | 3 | Spec specifies a revenue instrument, not what it buys. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7B | 3 | Same. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7C | 3 | Same. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7D | 3 | Same. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7E | 3 | Same. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7F | 4 | ws11: BBB had to be written time-limited to fit the budget window; a self-financing dedicated revenue stream relieves exactly that constraint, and taxes are budgetary. No parliamentarian precedent on trust funds in the base. | judgment-call |
| 7G | 3 | Spec ambiguous (federal fund vs. Vermont-state analogue). | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7H | 4 | ws03: Georgia lottery earmark verified at ~30 years of operation; ws04/ws15: DC PEF's lesson is that these programmes need dedicated revenue. Anchor 3 = "dedicated revenue"; 4 for dedicated revenue plus a broad payer/beneficiary base. | evidenced |
| 7I | 3 | Spending side unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7J | 3 | Unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7K | 3 | Unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7L | 3 | Unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7M | 3 | The spec flags an incidence critique; the base contains no payroll-tax incidence evidence. Held neutral deliberately. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 7N | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 8A | 4 | Direct federal employment sets pay directly (spec: "pays properly"); ws15 lists the DoD deep-dive as pending, so no parity evidence exists — hence 4 not 5, and no pipeline component. | judgment-call |
| 8B | 4 | Direct provision builds capacity by construction; docked from 5 because rural/nontraditional targeting is unspecified (ws05). | judgment-call |
| 8C | 3 | "Alongside the market" = a partial offer, not a universal one — anchor 3 by the spec's own scope. | judgment-call |
| 8D | 3 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 8E | 3 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 8F | 4 | ws11 names architecture 8: standards inside federal spending programmes are the most Byrd-defensible location. (Political difficulty is not in this anchor.) | evidenced |
| 8G | 5 | ws06: direct-federal delivery is the holdout-proof answer; no state role. | evidenced |
| 8H | 3 | Federal employment implies entanglement, but no dedicated revenue and no constituency evidenced; spec calls it hardest politically. Nets out. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 8I | 5 | Anchor 5 is direct provision; ws09 asymmetry. | evidenced |
| 8J | 5 | Anchor 5: does not depend on incumbent participation (ws12's exit finding does not bind). | evidenced |
| 8K | 2 | ws08: a centre-based public buildout misreads the 0–3 market (26.5% individual unpaid care). Applying "centre-based" to the public option is my reading. | judgment-call |
| 8L | 5 | Anchor 5: direct provision / small-N audit surface; ws06 contrasts this with demand-side clawback exposure. | evidenced |
| 8M | 3 | Nothing in base on siting/incidence. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 8N | 3 | Nothing in base (DoD case pending). | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9A | 3 | No compensation mechanism specified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9B | 3 | Mixed match + fallback; nothing in base on capacity effects. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9C | 4 | Universal reach via match plus fallback in holdouts; docked as for a2 (Germany/Quebec show offers can go unfilled). | judgment-call |
| 9D | 4 | Same. | judgment-call |
| 9E | 3 | Silent on school-age. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9F | 4 | ws11: the direct-federal spending component is the Byrd-defensible home; state incentives are conditions on new money (contested middle). | judgment-call |
| 9G | 5 | ws06 verbatim: a fallback "isn't insurance, it's the difference between a national program and a blue-state program"; H11.3 calls it the highest-value design feature. | evidenced |
| 9H | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9I | 3 | Mixed instruments = anchor 3 (ws09 instrument-dependence). | evidenced-wash |
| 9J | 3 | State-set rates in participating states carry ws12's exit risk; the federal arm does not. Nets out. | evidenced-wash |
| 9K | 3 | Unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9L | 3 | Unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9M | 3 | Unspecified. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 9N | 3 | Participating/non-participating contrast is observational = anchor 3. | evidenced-wash |
| 10A | 2 | ws12: Tri-Share's measured output is $14M of family savings at market prices; no compensation component in the instrument. | evidenced |
| 10B | 2 | ws12: $14M cumulative statewide over ~4 years ≈ ~1,000 child-years — pilot scale, no capacity built. | evidenced |
| 10C | 2 | ws12: pilot scale as implemented; scoring as-implemented per discipline 1. | evidenced |
| 10D | 2 | Same. | evidenced |
| 10E | 2 | Same. | evidenced |
| 10F | 4 | ws11: voluntary money, no mandates. | judgment-call |
| 10G | 3 | Federal match may replace the state share, but state hubs and employer participation remain required; ws12 shows state-by-state adoption (6 replicas). Nets out. | evidenced-wash |
| 10H | 3 | ws12: replicating across MI/OH/WV/CT/ND/IN/MO (durable appeal) vs. pilot scale and Chicago Fed's "promise-and-administration tension". | evidenced-wash |
| 10I | 2 | Pays market price on the demand side; ws09's demand-side pass-through finding applies. Not 1 — the three-way split is partly employer-borne. | judgment-call |
| 10J | 2 | ws12: §45F, the employer channel, is near-dead as historically structured (a couple hundred claims, <$20M in 2016), and Tri-Share remains pilot scale. Anchor-fit disclosure: the anchor is written about provider participation; I am scoring employer participation, which is this architecture's binding participation channel. | judgment-call |
| 10K | 3 | Nothing in base on arrangement mix under Tri-Share. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 10L | 3 | Chicago Fed administration tension (ws12) vs. standard grant oversight. | evidenced-wash |
| 10M | 2 | Definitional exclusion of families without a participating employer, plus ws12's §45F uptake evidence that the employer channel is thin. This is partly a mechanism argument about scope — flagged. | judgment-call |
| 10N | 3 | Multi-state adoption gives observational variation only = anchor 3. | evidenced-wash |
| 11A | 2 | Pays the chosen caregiver, not the licensed ECE workforce; no parity or pipeline component (contrast ws04 DC PEF, which is what anchor 5 describes). | judgment-call |
| 11B | 2 | ws08: 26.5% of under-3s are already in individual unpaid care — the instrument monetises existing arrangements rather than creating capacity. | judgment-call |
| 11C | 4 | ws08: under-3s' modal arrangement is individual (parent/kin) care and "the infant/toddler home-care preference is confirmed in usage data — directly relevant to architecture 11". This is the one instrument on the board that funds that arrangement. Docked from 5: no take-up or adequacy evidence. | evidenced |
| 11D | 3 | ws08: 3–5s' modal arrangement is centre-based (42.1%); an allowance can pay a centre but the record says nothing about fit or adequacy at this band. | evidenced-wash |
| 11E | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 11F | 4 | ws11: money survives; no behavioural mandate. | judgment-call |
| 11G | 4 | A federal allowance needs no state opt-in; docked from 5 because the spec also references the CCDF relative-care channel, which is state-run. | judgment-call |
| 11H | 3 | Nothing in base (Nordic durability evidence is listed as pending in ws15). | unevidenced-neutral |
| 11I | 3 | Payments to parents/kin sit outside the priced market (no fee to inflate); payments toward purchased care carry ws09's demand-side risk. Genuine wash. | evidenced-wash |
| 11J | 4 | Does not depend on incumbent centres accepting public rates (ws12's exit finding doesn't bind); the informal supply it pays already exists (ws08). | judgment-call |
| 11K | 5 | ws08 is the anchor-5 sentence almost verbatim: funds the arrangement families actually choose, by band, for the 0–3 band where every other architecture misreads the market. | evidenced |
| 11L | 3 | ws06's Netherlands demand-side clawback caution applies, against the simplicity of paying a family directly. Nets out. | evidenced-wash |
| 11M | 3 | A case for 4 exists (kin care is available in deserts where centres are not — ws05 + ws08), but combining those two facts is mechanism reasoning, so I declined the uplift. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 11N | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12A | 1 | Non-earmarked transfer: no compensation or pipeline funding at all — anchor 1 by the comparator's own definition. | evidenced (definitional) |
| 12B | 1 | Anchor 1 "builds no capacity; pure transfer" by definition; ws12 confirms private capital is not building at market prices, so nothing supplies the response. | evidenced |
| 12C | 3 | Universal money reaches every household but the instrument makes no care-specific offer; the base contains no evidence on cash→care coverage. Anchors fit this row badly. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12D | 3 | Same. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12E | 3 | Same. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12F | 5 | ws11: tax-side money is the cleanest reconciliation fit; nothing here mandates behaviour. Identical to 5F. | evidenced |
| 12G | 5 | No state machinery; ws06 holdout base case does not bite. Identical to 5G. | evidenced |
| 12H | 3 | No CTC-specific durability evidence in the base. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12I | 2 | ws09: pass-through holds for demand-side instruments. Not 1: unearmarked cash produces a weaker and more diffuse childcare price impulse than an earmarked subsidy. | judgment-call |
| 12J | 4 | Imposes nothing on providers, so ws12's below-cost-rate exit risk does not apply. Equals 5J — the two rows are genuinely indistinguishable here. | judgment-call |
| 12K | 4 | Unrestricted money constrains no arrangement; docked from 5 because it funds no arrangement specifically (contrast a11, which pays the chosen caregiver by design). | judgment-call |
| 12L | 3 | Not care-conditional, so not the Netherlands shape; but no cited evidence either way. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12M | 3 | No incidence evidence in the base for an equivalently-funded child benefit. | unevidenced-neutral |
| 12N | 3 | Nothing in base. | unevidenced-neutral |
3. What my matrix implies
On my own numbers the strongest row is a4 (K–12 extension) — it is the only architecture with cited evidence on almost every axis (durable red-state universal pre-K, dedicated Georgia-lottery-style revenue, direct provision on the pass-through and integrity axes, near-parity pay through district salary structures, and explicit school-age scope) — but it carries a hard 1 on coverage_02, which is a disqualifying gap on the age band the rest of the record says is hardest. Behind it sit a3 (Head Start scaled) and a8 (public option), which win on the four axes the record speaks to most loudly (federalism/holdout-proofing, pass-through, participation, integrity, plus ws11's Byrd point about standards inside spending programmes) and lose on preference fit for 0–3; and a6 (supply-first), the only row with a 5 on relief_workforce, dragged down by an evidenced 2 on durability (DC PEF's annual survival battles; the ARPA cliff). The weakest row is a10 (federalized Tri-Share), the only architecture whose real-world instance is measured in the record and comes out at ~1,000 child-years. a5, a2, cash_comparator all land at the same total (43) by different routes — a5 buys procedural cleanliness at the cost of pass-through and integrity, a2 buys legal entitlement at the cost of federalism and provider participation, and the cash comparator buys nothing on the supply side at all, which is what the brief said it was there to show. Large parts of the board are flat at 3, particularly distributional (ten rows at 3) and evaluability (eleven rows at 3) — the evidence base simply contains no architecture-specific findings on either.
4. Evidence-coverage count
Cells scored on cited evidence (non-3 cells plus 3s marked evidenced / evidenced-wash), out of 14:
| Architecture | Evidence-based | Unevidenced-neutral |
|---|---|---|
| a1_ccdf_supercharge | 12 | 2 |
| a2_medicaid_entitlement | 8 | 6 |
| a3_headstart_scaled | 10 | 4 |
| a4_k12_extension | 13 | 1 |
| a5_demand_allowance | 12 | 2 |
| a6_supply_first | 10 | 4 |
| a7_social_insurance | 2 | 12 |
| a8_public_option | 11 | 3 |
| a9_fallback_ladder | 6 | 8 |
| a10_trishare_federal | 12 | 2 |
| a11_caregiver_choice | 10 | 4 |
| cash_comparator | 7 | 7 |
Board totals: 113 evidence-based, 55 unevidenced-neutral. Of the evidence-based cells, 34 are flagged judgment-call and 20 are evidenced-wash.
5. What I could not score, and what would change my mind
Whole rows I could not score. a7 (social insurance) is 12/14 neutral: the evidence base contains a revenue fact (Georgia lottery earmark verified; Vermont payroll tax "pending primary-source pass") and nothing about what the fund buys, who administers it, or payroll-tax incidence. Its two non-neutral cells rest on the earmark-durability finding and on ws11's budget-window logic. a9 (fallback ladder) is 8/14 neutral: the record is emphatic about the federalism value of a fallback (ws06) and silent about everything downstream of it. cash_comparator is half-neutral because the base contains no CTC or child-benefit evidence at all — it is a comparator with no comparator literature attached.
The a11 maternal-employment trade. The brief says a11's maternal-employment tradeoff "appears in the demand/precedent evidence." I could not find it. ws15 lists "Nordics" among remaining §15 work, and no document in the base contains a home-care-allowance employment finding. I have therefore named the trade here rather than hiding it, but I did not score any cell down on it — that would be scoring an assertion in the row spec, not evidence. Had the Finnish employment evidence been in the base, I would expect it to bite on distributional (foregone maternal earnings) and possibly relief_supply (withdrawal from the formal-care market), and I would likely have scored 11M and 11B lower.
Anchors that fit badly. (a) participation_risk is written entirely about provider acceptance of public rates, which leaves employer-mediated (a10) and family-side (a5, a11, cash) designs scoring well on an axis where their real participation risk lies elsewhere; I disclosed this at 10J. (b) The three coverage anchors measure a care offer, which makes the cash comparator unscoreable in the intended sense — I held it at 3 rather than invent a reading. (c) evaluability reserves 4–5 for staged/lottery rollout, which no architecture on this board specifies, so the column is nearly constant by construction; a4's 4 rests on the observation that oversubscribed district pre-K has in fact produced the record's only causal evidence.
What would move specific cells. A DoD childcare deep-dive (flagged pending in ws15) would settle 8A/8B/8K and probably lift a8. A Head Start age-scope and setting-mix source would settle 3E and 3K, which are currently my reading rather than the record's. Medicaid holdout counts and tribal set-asides (flagged pending in ws06) would firm up 2G, which I scored 2 on the CBO/BBB analogue rather than Medicaid-specific data. The Netherlands case in any detail would decide whether 5L is a 1 or a 2. A primary source on Vermont Act 76 and the NM permanent fund would take a7 off the neutral line. And any evidence on who receives benefits under each design — the distributional column is where this board is most thoroughly blind.