Date: 2026-08-03. Builds on Phase 0 (Canada, red-state pre-K). Comparison-template pass across remaining cases; transferability notes inline.
Quebec (1997– ): the queue is permanent, and staffing is why
- 30,688 children on the waiting list as of May 31, 2025; estimated shortage >60,000 spots (CBC)
- Workers and operators name the staffing shortage (low wages, few recruits) as the main obstacle to opening more subsidized spots (CBC 2021); recent budget converts 5,000 unsubsidized spots rather than building new
- Two-tier structure persists: subsidized CPE spots rationed by queue; unsubsidized market priced higher — price-below-cost without matched supply investment produces rationing by waitlist, durable across 25+ years
- Transferability: this is the steady state of a demand-heavy design under a binding workforce constraint. The US analog of a CPE queue is invisible rationing (families that never find a slot)
Germany (2013– ): an enforceable entitlement shifts cost, it does not create supply
- Legal entitlement to a place from age 1; courts have ruled staff shortages do not void it — municipalities must offer a place or pay (damages / alternative-care costs) (The Local, Handbook Germany)
- Multi-year waits persist in major cities despite the entitlement
- Transferability finding (for §14 architecture 2): a Medicaid-style individual entitlement in the US would function the same way — litigable access rights that transfer money to families who sue, while the binding constraint (educators) remains. An entitlement is a forcing device for appropriations, not a supply mechanism
Australia: pass-through at national scale
- Demand-side subsidy through a majority for-profit market; fees have outrun subsidy increases (avg hourly fee +4.4% YoY in a representative period; parents >$10/hr) (Guardian/pressreader)
- Canberra now attaches conditions aimed at stopping wage-funding from passing straight into fees (Dept. of Education) — i.e., the government that ran the cleanest demand-side experiment concluded it needed supply-side strings. Direct evidence for H9.1 and against §14 architecture 5 unaccompanied
Cross-case synthesis (with Phase 0 cases)
| Case | Design | Signature failure | Lesson for §14 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quebec | Supply-side, price-capped | Permanent queues; staffing-bound | Price cap without workforce investment → rationing |
| Germany | Legal entitlement | Enforceable right, unfillable slots | Entitlement ≠ supply |
| Australia | Demand-side subsidy, for-profit market | Fee inflation absorbs subsidy | Demand-side needs rate/supply conditions |
| Canada (CWELCC) | Federal-provincial agreements | Space + ECE targets missed; for-profit cap fight | Live: workforce binds; rate-participation fight real |
| GA/OK/FL | Universal pre-K, modest spend | Durable but shallow (FL: high coverage, low standards) | Universality is enactable red-state; quality is the variable |
| DC PEF | Wage supplement | Works, but annually contested funding | Compensation programs need dedicated revenue |
The pattern across every case: the binding constraint is educators, and every design that ignored it converted money into queues (Quebec), litigation (Germany), or price (Australia). The protocol's central working hypothesis now has support from five independent national designs. Remaining §15 work: DoD deep-dive, Lanham, Nordics, NYC contracting detail, UK rate mechanics.