| W1 |
Liebman, Understanding the Increase in DI Benefit Receipt, JEP 29(2) 2015 |
Peer-reviewed decomposition |
Post-early-1990s: aging + women’s insured ≈ ⅔ of DI-receipt rise; male adjusted incidence flat; 1980s incidence/policy swing separate |
Not a single 1980s–2010s pooled %; DI focus |
| W2 |
SSA, Trends in SSDI (bp2019-01) |
Agency briefing paper |
Summarizes OCACT gross vs age-sex-adjusted incidence; Pattison/Waldron insured-rate split; points to Liebman / Daly et al. |
Secondary synthesis of primary series |
| W3 |
SSA OACT, 2025 Trustees Fig. V.C3 plot points |
Trustees data table |
Age-sex-adjusted incidence 6.4 (2010) → 4.0 (2019) → 2.9 (2022–23) → 3.3 (2024) |
Incidence ≠ prevalence |
| W4 |
Liu & Quinby / CRR, Why Did DI Rolls Drop 2015–2019? IB 23-18 |
Independent brief |
2010–19 incidence drop: business cycle −0.14 pp; residual ALJ/stringency −0.12 pp; aging +0.02 pp |
Residual attributed to ALJ policy by leftover, not RCT |
| W5 |
Duggan growth chapter PDF (Wharton) |
Academic chapter ~2005 window |
Larger shares to replacement rates / medical criteria for 1984–2003 |
Earlier window; conflicts with Liebman shares for that era |
| W6 |
SSA ODSSI, FY2024 Workload Data: Disability Decisions |
Agency workload |
Stage allows; AC remand 16%; federal court remand 63% of 15,753 |
Decision-year, not filing cohort |
| W7 |
GAO-18-37, Hearings accuracy/consistency |
GAO statistical model, FY2007–2015 |
Post-controls ALJ allowance range up to 46 pp; office range ~19 pp; −5 pp narrowing |
Vintage ends FY2015 |
| W8 |
SSA, A04 AC remands / all AC RR dispositions |
Public appeals data |
FY2024 AC remand 18.05% (13,330 / 73,834) |
All AC RR, not disability-only |
| W9 |
SSA, A06 Court remands vs new court cases |
Public appeals data |
Court remand receipts FY2023 10,467; FY2024 10,030 |
Not matched to same-year filings |
| W10 |
SSA OIG, Major Management Challenges FY2024 |
IG |
Hearing APT 450→342; pending ~322k→~262k; initial APT 218→231 |
Management-challenges framing |
| W11 |
SSA, FY2024 AFR — Other Reporting Requirements |
AFR Payment Integrity |
SSI IP 10.62%; OASDI ~0.30%; cause %; stewardship = nonmedical; CDR ≠ original error |
Not intentional-fraud rate |
| W12 |
SSA, CDI Expansion Progress Report 2022 |
Agency BBA report |
FY2021 CDI 74 judicial actions; projected savings figures |
Judicial actions ≠ all fraud; savings are projections |
| W13 |
SSA BBA §845(a) FY2020 program-integrity narrative (AFR materials) |
Agency |
FY2020 CDI 1,729 cessations/denials; 77 judicial actions |
Single-year snapshot |
| W14 |
Anderson et al. / CRR WP 2022-11 |
Mathematica–SSA grant paper |
FY2019 disabled-worker FMRs 215,720; mailers 766,913; initial cessations+FTC 39,056 |
Cites SSA; not the open-data CSV itself |
| W15 |
SSA OIG A-01-21-51038 (DDS COVID workload) |
OIG audit |
Pre-COVID comparison: 136,481 DDS CDR cessations |
Period labels in audit tables; not a fraud count |
| W16 |
SSA OIG Spring 2026 SAR |
IG SAR |
Half-year: 221 convictions + 7 diversions (all OI categories) |
Not disability-only; not matched to IP $ |
| W17 |
SSA, Red Book — SSDI employment supports / What's New 2024 |
Agency rules handbook |
TWP / EPE / extended Medicare (≥93 mo); 2024 SGA 1, 550 * *non − blind; TWPservicemonth * *1,110 |
Parameters index annually |
| W18 |
SSA, SSI ASR 2023 §7 — recipients who work / 1619 |
Federal statistical report |
1619(b) 18–64 108,825 = 2.6% of blind/disabled 18–64 |
Continuance ≠ employment rate |
| W19 |
Abt/Mathematica, BOND FER Vol. 1 (2018); Abt Removing the Cash Cliff brief |
SSA-commissioned RCT/demo |
Offset: null mean earnings; Stage 1 benefits +143 * */yr; Stage2 * *+450–500/yr; EWIC null |
Demo ≠ current national policy |
| W20 |
Gettens et al., Evaluation of WA Medicaid Buy-In (JDPS 2012) |
Matched state evaluation |
MBI associated with higher work/earnings vs matched conventional Medicaid |
Single-state |
| W21 |
Gimm et al., Mathematica “three E’s” MBI 2006; Liu & Weathers earnings notes |
SSA/CMS-era MBI outcome series |
~40% of wage-earning MBI participants increased earnings post-enrollment |
Pre/post among enrollees; selection |
| W22 |
BPC, Improving the Medicaid Buy-In (2022) |
Policy brief |
Last comprehensive national MBI enrollment ~193k (2011); data gap since |
Stale headcount |
| W23 |
SSA, Effects of TTW… Outcomes vs Design, SSB v83n1 |
Agency synthesis of Mathematica eval |
ITT STW effects null/not robust; service enrollment ↑; participant≠population |
Not a single pp employment cell |
| W24 |
Wittenburg et al., Initial TTW impacts, JVR 27 (2007) |
Peer-reviewed extract of Mathematica |
Service enrollment +0.1 to +0.4pp; no compelling earnings/benefit impacts (first 2 yrs) |
Early rollout window |
| W25 |
Mamun & Page / Stapleton–Mamun–Page TTW impact studies (2013–14) |
Mathematica / IZA |
Service enrollment ↑; no consistent months-without-benefits impact; STW power ≪2pp absolute |
Young new awardees / phase designs |
| W26 |
SSA, SSI ASR 2023 — children under 18 |
Federal statistical report |
Under-18 recipients 983,169 (Dec 2023) |
Point-in-time |
| W27 |
CRS R49011, PRWORA at 30: SSI for Children |
CRS |
PRWORA child standard; caseload arc 1996–2024; Zebley context |
Secondary to statute/ASR |
| W28 |
GAO-12-497, Children’s SSI benefits |
GAO |
~54% denial of child mental claims; school-evidence gaps; childhood CDR collapse |
Window FY2000–2011 |
| W29 |
SSA SSB v84n4, child SSI CDRs and participation |
Agency research |
CDRs explain ~⅔ of 2014–2021 child caseload decline in simulations |
Simulation, not RCT |
| W30 |
NAS / Urban Institute disability decision-process syntheses (eventual-allowance flows) |
Research synthesis |
Hearing allowances = appeals of prior denials; large share of appealed claims eventually allowed |
Not a new DRF extract |
| W31 |
CRS R41289; SSA EN-64-125 |
CRS / agency fact sheet |
VA VASRD 0–100% partial ratings vs SSDI binary SGA |
VA ≠ transferable cash architecture |
| W32 |
CBPP Dutch DI blueprint; SSA SSB v86n1 (Dutch WIA methods) |
Policy / agency journal |
NL partial benefits + 2-year employer sickness + experience rating |
Financing preconditions mandatory |
| W33 |
UK NAO/DWP ESA–PIP / WCA reassessment record (cautionary) |
Foreign admin / audit lineage |
Reassessment turbulence; tribunal overturns; process unfit critiques |
Transferability = caution, not model |
| W34 |
SSA OIG, Nearly $72B improperly paid FY2015–22 (2024-08-19) |
IG release |
Cumulative improper payments ~$72B; <1% of benefits |
Not a fraud total — citogenesis root |
| W35 |
Poynter, Musk/WH Social Security fraud claims (2025) |
Fact-check |
Documents $70B+ fraud relabel of OIG improper-payment figure |
Secondary to W34 |
| W36 |
SSI ASR 2023 Table 37 — recipients with representative payee by diagnosis |
Federal statistical report |
Payee rates by mental diagnosis (heterogeneous); under-18 ≈99.9% |
Stock, not awards |
| W37 |
Klee et al., rep-payee health outcomes systematic review (Psychiatr Serv) |
Peer-reviewed review citing SSA |
Of ~1.7M disability beneficiaries with payees, 77.5% mental disorders |
Cites SSA; vintage ~2017 counts |
| W38 |
BPC Disability Insurance Working Group package (2015 window) |
Bipartisan policy package |
Solvency-as-vehicle for DI reform; offset + buy-in proposals competed with reallocation fights |
Political-economy, not RCT |